αναδημοσίευση από: http://thesis.haverford.edu/dspace/handle/10066/5504
by JOHN LOUIS HONDROS
A British Political Intelligence Paper (Middle East) of 18 June 1944 begins, "In this Paper the word 'quisling' is applied to those who have collaborated with the Germans but it does not necessarily imply pro-German sentiments. The term 'Quisling forces' is used for all those bodies who accepted arms from the Germans for use in the field against other Greeks." This peculiar consideration of Greek collaborationists temmed from the Foreign Office's committment to the restoration of King George II and his government-in-exile. Prime Minister Churchill and the top officials of the Foreign Office were convinced that this restoration offered the only means of establishing a stable and friendly Greek government in Athens which would help secure Britain's postwar geopolitical interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.
By 1943 the Greek Communist Party's (KKE) The National Liberation Front (EAM) and its National Popular Liberation Army (ELAS) presented a formidable obstacle to the success of British policy. As Colonel T. Thornton, the Deputy Director of Military Intelligence succinctly noted on 18 May 1943: "Our aim in Greece is to prepare an efficient force ready to co-operate with us in the re-occupation of the country and the installment of a stable government. E.A.M. cannot be relied on to give us such co-operation." […]
 Public Record Office (PRO) War Office (WO) 208/713, Political Intelligence Paper No. 55, Greek Security Battalions, 18 June 1944.
 Prokopis Papastratis, British Policy Toward Greece During the Second World War (London, 1984), pp. 217-218; John C. Loulis, The Greek Communist Party (London, 1982), p. 75.
 PRO, WO 208/698A, Reports on the Greek Resistance February-May 1943, Thornton minutes (prepared for the Director of Military Intelligence), 18 May 1943.